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Political Factoid

The Boeing 737 MAX Airplane
and what we think we know so far: *
W-O-R-K-I-N-G   D-R-A-F-T
Background/history
  1. Historical airplane design principles
     
    1. Safety first  cf. H146
    2. Redundancy
    3. Default stability of airframe in flight
      cf. Safety-bicycle type design policy
      Hands off and it tends to go straight
  2. Trends over the years:
     
    1. Mechanical controls replaced by hydraulic controls
    2. Hydraulic controls replaced by electrical controls (a.k.a. fly-by-wire)
    3. Hardware controls replaced by software controls
      cf. World over, software is overly complex
      and prone to have bugs,
      "Bluescreen at 35,000 feet"
  3. Aircraft certification process bootstraps from previous models
    (a.k.a. cost saving short cuts)
    cf. Like taking an old house, tearing it down to
    its foundation, and building a new, larger house
    --- saving on costs of zoning, permitting, and other
    applications, approvals, and inspections
  4. Coziness between Boeing and FAA
    (typical of any industry-government arrangement)
Enter the MAX model
  1. New larger, heavier engines for greater speed, range, fuel efficiency
    creating a shift in the center of gravity
    and producing a significantly increased risk
     
    1. Tendency to nose up on take off into a stall
    2. Automatic software compensation added to drive nose down
    3. Software triggered by single sensor (and single-point of failure)
Straying off the path of proper design
  1. Inadequate testing for the new risk modes
    (Test to show it works, but no tests to show when it fails)
    cf. Push No.1 button and the green light comes on
    Push No.2 button and the red light comes on
    -- all per the specifications
    but what happens if both buttons No.1 and
    No.2 get pushed at the same time?
  2. Additional pilot training not required/provided
    (That would cost money, take time, and make the airplane
    less attractive in the marketplace.)

     
  3. No information about the new system in the airplane manual
      (See No.5b above)
The Results   cf. FPR
  1. Incidents have been encountered, some reported, but not acted upon.
     
  2. Problems identified by the Lion Air crash
  3. Boeing sets out to revise software
     
  4. Second 737 Max crash occurs in Ethiopia
Denial and Potential Coverup by Boeing and the FAA
(If we deny the problem, it won't be one)  cf. 10022
  1. Boeing continued to claim airplanes to be safe
  2. FAA echoed what Boeing said   (See No.4 above)
     
  3. Position of FAA Director vacant in Trump Administration
    1. No replacement nominated by President Trump (budget cut?)
    2. FAA falls under Department of Transportation
    3. Sec. of Transportation is wife of obstructionist Mitch McConnell ('nuf said?)
     
  4. Fmr. Boeing exec is now Trump's acting Sec. of Defense (DOD)
     
  5. Airlines and governments around the world started to ground
    the 737 MAX out of safety-first caution
     
    1. Boeing CEO went to Mar-a-Lago and talked with President Trump
    2. Boeing and Trump had subsequent phone calls.
    3. Trump, FAA, and Boeing continued to claim the airplane is safe.
America Last
  1. Many airlines grounded their own 737 MAX airplanes   (See No.1a above)
  2. China grounded 737 MAX airplanes
  3. Europe grounded 737 MAX airplanes
  4. Australia grounded 737 MAX airplanes
  5. Canada grounded 737 MAX airplanes
  6. The 737 MAX was no longer allowed to fly in or over
    any country other than the U.S. (2019-Mar-13)
     
  7. Finally, someone at the FAA issued an order grounding
    737 MAX airplanes in the US (2019-Mar-13)
Victory declared    cf. 20726
  1. Immediately, President Donald Trump claimed credit
    for the grounding "to error on the side of safety" (2019-Mar-13)
* Be careful about drawing conclusions
from what you think you know.
cf. 10408
 
cf. 21279, 4961, 8606, 8937, 9318, 15546, 18297, 21284
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Collected by students of  Zo^o University
Last updated * 2019-03-17
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